











or sometime now, the Fed has
implemented monetary policy by making
discreteadjustments to its target for the
federal fundsrate.  Given that a change in
the funds rate target is taken as a change in
monetary policy, it is not surprising that
the market reacts to actual and perceived
changes in theFed’s funds rate target, [e.g.,
Cook and Hahn(1989) and Thornton
(1996)].  Several interesting hypotheses
concerning the market’sreaction to target
changes deserve closer consideration.
First and foremost, does a target change
alter the market’s outlook for inﬂation?  It
is widely believed that the Fed has been
focusing on inﬂation and has responded to
inﬂation scares [e.g., Goodfriend (1993)].
Hence, many analysts believe that an
increase in the funds rate target reﬂects an
increased concern by the Fed about inﬂa-
tion.  In this article, I will show how
information about the market’s
expectations on inﬂation can be extracted
from the differential response of short-
term and long-term rates to federal funds
rate target changes.  I also will investigate
the extent to which short-term and long-
term rates respond differently to changes
in the funds rate target.
In addition, it is sometimes thought
that the magnitude of the target adjustment
reﬂects the intensity of the Fed’s resolve.
Adjustments to the funds ratetarget have
ranged from a sixteenth of a percentage
point to 75 basis points.  If the market
believes that the size of the target change
is an indication of the Fed’s policy resolve,
then the market’s reaction would change
with the size of the target change.  
In a similar vein, the Fed occasionally
changes the discount rate when adjusting
the funds rate target.  If the market believes
that such actions also reﬂect a greater policy
resolve, then the reaction might be larger
when the Fed underscores its funds rate
action with a discount rate change.
Finally, once it acts, the Fed typically
makes additional funds rate adjustments in
the same direction.  The market has come
to expect this behavior, so that successive
moves in the same direction are more likely
to be anticipated than the ﬁrst move in a
new direction.  Hence, it has been suggested
that the market’s reaction might be larger
when Fed policy changes direction, i.e.,
the Fed lowers its funds rate target after a
prolonged period of upward adjustments
or vice versa.
The purpose of this paper is to inves-
tigate whether the reactions of the short-term
and long-term interest rates provide infor-
mation about the market’s expectations for
inﬂation.  In addition, the paper investigates
whether (1) the market’s reaction varies
with the magnitude of target changes, (2)
the reaction is larger when accompanied
by discount rate changes, and (3) the reac-
tion is larger when there is a policy reversal.
TARGET CHANGES AND
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Regardless of their maturity, all interest
rates have both a real and an inﬂation
expectation component.  Therefore, a
nominal interest rate, i, can be expressed as
,
where r denotes the real component of the
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1 The reader is cautioned to note
that this statement does not
mean there is no inﬂation
expectation component for very
short-term interest rates, only
that it need not change below
some horizon.
2 Strictly speaking, this equation
applies only to rates on zero
coupon bonds expressed in log-
arithms,  see Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay (1997).
3 From March 1984 through
September 1989, the Fed
changed its funds rate target
76 times.  By contrast, the tar-
get was changed just 32 times
from October 1989 to
December 1997.
4 The pattern of changing the dis-
count rate only when the funds
rate target was changed was
initiated under Chairman
Greenspan.  Other chairman fre-
quently adjusted the discount
rate without simultaneously
changing the funds rate target.
5 The 3-month and 12-month
rates are secondary market
rates on treasury securities with
these maturities.  The long-term
rates are constant maturity
yields.  All rates are taken from
the Board of Governors, H.15
Statistical Release.
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inﬂation expectation component.  Interest
rates of all maturities respond to new
information about real returns and future
inﬂation.  News of a federal funds rate
target change may provide information
about both.  Furthermore, news of a policy
change is likely to move the real and inﬂa-
tion expectation components in opposite
directions.  For example, an increase in the
funds rate target is thought to raise the real
federal funds rate and, hence, the real
component of all rates.  Because such an
action signals a more restrictive monetary
policy, however, it may also cause the market
to revise its inﬂation expectation downward.
Consequently, a change in the funds rate
target could cause nominal interest rates to
rise or fall depending on the relative mag-
nitude of these effects.
Because the effect of a policy action on
inﬂation is not likely to be immediate, a
revision of the inﬂation outlook is likely to
have either a small or no effect on shorter-
term rates.1Hence, most market analysts
believe that short-term rates should move
in the same direction as the target change.
Because the effect of an inﬂation outlook
change should be larger, the longer the term
to maturity, long-term rates could rise, fall
or be unchanged—depending on whether
the revision to the inﬂation outlook was
smaller, larger, or exactly equal to the
change in the real rate.
The above analysis suggests that one
can determine whether target changes caused
the market to revise its inﬂation outlook
by investigating the differential response of
short-term and long-term rates.  It is not quite
this simple, however.  Long-term rates may
not respond signiﬁcantly to targetchanges
even if individuals do not revise their inﬂa-
tion outlook.  Many economists believe
that long-term rates are related to short-
term rates according to the expectations
theory of the term structure of interest
rates.  The expectations theory states that
the long-term rate is equal to the market’s
current expectation for the short-term rate
plus a constant risk premium.2
If the expectations theory holds, a rise
in the short-term rate—that is expected to
last for the term of the long-term bond, or
longer—will increase the long-term rate 
by the same amount.  If the expectations
theory holds and if policy actions have
only a temporary effect on the real rate,
the effect of a target change on long-term
rates will be smaller, the longer the term to
maturity.  For example, let us assume that
the expectations theory holds and the Fed
raises the funds rate target from 5 to 5.5
percent, but the market expects the Fed to
reduce the target back to 5 percent after a
year.  The one-year rate would rise by the
entire 50 basis points; however, the 10-
year rate would increase by only ﬁve basis
points and the 30-year rate by less than two
basis points.  Because of this possibility,
ﬁnding that long-term rates respond little
to changes in the funds rate target does not
necessarily imply that the market has revised
its expectation for inﬂation.  It may simply
indicate that the change in the real rate is
expected to be temporary.
THE MARKET’S REACTION
TO TARGET CHANGES
The analysis presented here covers 
the period from October 2, 1989, through
December 31, 1997.  Since late 1989, the
Fed has adjusted its funds rate target by at
least 25 basis points and funds rate adjust-
ments have been less frequent.3 Prior to
that, adjustments were as small as a sixteenth,
i.e., 6.25 basis points.  
During the sample period the Fed made
32 adjustments to its funds rate target.  Of
these, seven were greater than 25 basis points
in absolute value; the rest were 25 basis-
point changes.  On 12 occasions the Fed
simultaneously changed the discount rate,
and there was no instance when the discount
rate was changed without changing the funds
rate target.4 All of the seven target changes
greater than 25 basis points were accompa-
nied by a discount rate change.
Four market interest rates are used in
this analysis: the rates on 3-month, 12-
month, 10-year, and 30-year Treasury
securities, denoted T3m, T12m, T10y, and
T30y, respectively.5 The Federal Reserve
Bank of New York provided the Fed’s fed-
eral funds rate target, fftar.FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFST. LOUIS
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6 The equations were estimated
using the Newey-West (1987)
heteroskedastic autocorrelation
consistent estimate of the vari-
ances.
7 If the target change were com-
pletely anticipated, the rate
would not respond to target
changes, i.e., b =0 . Hence,
ﬁnding that b =0 for all rates
would not necessarily imply
that the market did not respond
to target changes, but merely
thatthe changes were anticipat-
ed.   Robertson and Thornton
(1997) show that funds rate
target changes appear to be dif-
ﬁcult to predict, which suggests
that part of any change is likely
to be unanticipated.
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The market’s reaction to changes in
the funds rate target is investigated by esti-
mating the equation
where idenotes one of the four Treasury
rates.6The coefﬁcient bmeasures the
market’s response to the unanticipated
portion of the target change.7Estimates of
Equation 1using the four interest rates are
presented in Table 1.  Both short-term
rates respond signiﬁcantly to changes in
the funds rate target.  The reactions of the
long-term rates are much smaller and nei-
ther response is statistically signiﬁcant.  
Is the statistically insigniﬁcant response
of the long-term rates because the market
has changed its inﬂation outlook or because
the market believes that the change in the real
rate is temporary?  Answering this question
is difﬁcult.  If the lack of a response is because
the change in the real rate is expected to be
temporary, however, the reaction of long-
term rates should always be small.  If it is
because of inﬂation expectations, long-term
rates might rise sometimes and fall at others.
In the latter case, the absolute change in
long-term rates should be larger on days
when the Fed changes the funds rate target
than on other days.
The mean and median of the absolute
change in T10yand T30yon target-change
days were .077 and .060, and .066 and .060,
respectively.  The mean and median of
absolute changes on other days were .042
and .030, and .037 and .030, respectively.
Are the means and medians larger on target
change days than on non-target change
days?  Because the absolute value is bounded
by zero, the usual difference tests cannot
be used to test the null hypotheses that the
means and medians on target-change days
and other days are equal.  Hence, the critical
values for these hypotheses were determined
by bootstrapping 10,000 samples, size 32,
for both rates from the 2,043 days when
there was no change in the target.  The 1
percent critical values for the mean of T10y
and T30yare .0597 and .0538, respectively.
The 1 percent critical value for the median
of both rates was .05.  Because the means
and medians on target change days are larger
than these values, the null hypotheses of
equality is rejected at the 1 percent signiﬁ-
cance level in every case.
When Is No Signiﬁcant Response a
Signiﬁcant Response? 
When is no response a signiﬁcant
response?The answer is when no response
is different than would have otherwise
occurred.  On the average, these interest rates
tend to move together.  This is illustrated
in Table 2, which presents the correlation
between changes in the four rates.  While
the correlation tends to be higher for adja-
cent maturities, the correlation between
D T3mand D T30yis statistically signiﬁcant.
The correlation between D T3mand D T10y
1()=++ DD ifftar ttt gbe,
Correlations Between Changes
in Rates
T3m T12m T10y T30y
T3m1.000 0.667 0.407 0.345
T12m— 1.000 0.758 0.672
T10y— — 1.0000.944
T30y— — — 1.000
Table 2
The Market’s Response  









*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation
consistent covariance estimates with a lag of 7.
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8 For example, see Shiller,
Campbell, and Schoenholtz
(1983), and Campbell and
Shiller (1991).  Empirical sup-
port of the idea that short-term
Treasury rates are equal to the
market’s expectation for the
overnight federal funds rate is
particularly scant, see Thornton
(1998). 
9 Market participants do not shift
from one end of the market to
the other in response to
changes in rate differentials,
even if the rate at the long end
of the market is inconsistent
with their own expectation for
the future behavior of short-
term rates.
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and D T30ysuggests that there is a tendency
for long-term rates to move with the T-bill
rate.  Hence, the lack of a signiﬁcant response
of T10yand T30yto target changes is a
marked departure from the usual relation-
ship between the long-term rates and the
T-bill rate.
This can be demonstrated more clearly
by estimating the equation
(2)  ,
where D itdenotes the change in one of the
three other rates.  The coefﬁcient dmeasures
the “usual” association between D itand
D T3mt,and mmeasures the deviation from
this relationship per unit change in the
funds rate target. 
Estimates of Equation 2 are presented
in Table 3.  Note that the estimated reaction
of T30yto funds rate target changes in
Table 1 is identical to that obtained from
Table 3, given the estimated usual relation-
ship between D T3mand D T30yand the
estimate of m.  For example, the estimate
of bfrom Equation 1 indicates that T3m
changed .3082 percentage points for every
one-percentage point change in the funds rate
target.  The estimate of dfrom Equation 2
indicates that T30yusually changes by .4451
for any one-percentage point change in T3m.
If the usual relationship were maintained,
T30ywould have changed by 13.72 basis
points [(0.3082)(0.4451)100].  The estimate
of mindicates the T30ychanges by 10.30
basis points less than normal when the
funds rate target was changed, however.
Consequently, the T30yincreased by only
3.42 basis points [13.72 – 10.30], which is
the estimated response of T30yto a one-
percentage point change in the funds rate
target reported in Table 1.  Likewise, anal-
ogous calculations reveal that the estimated
responses of T12mand T10yobtained
from Table 3 are nearly identical to those
reported in Table 1.
While the estimated response of the
long-term rates to a target change is the same
from both speciﬁcations, the interpretations
differ.  The lack of a signiﬁcant change in the
10- and 30-year rates to a change in the funds
rate target is now seen as a statistically sig-
niﬁcant departure from what usually would
happen given the change in the 3-month rate.
The signiﬁcant departure from the usual
relationship between short-term and long-
term rates associated with changes in the
funds rate target tends to suggest that target
changes affect the market’s expectation for
inﬂation.  If not, why would changes in
T3m(associated with target changes) be
less permanent than other changes?   
Though prevalent in monetary policy
analyses [e.g., Cook and Hahn (1989) and
Goodfriend (1991)], empirical support for
the expectations theory is scant.8Hence,
interpreting these results in terms of the
expectations theory, as was just done, may
be unwise.  The alternative segmented mar-
ketshypothesis asserts that individuals have
a preference to borrow or lend in one end
of the market.9Because of this hypothesis,
as well as uncertainty, the long-term rate is
not necessarily equal to the average of the
market’s expectation for the short-term
rate, even when the risk premium is zero.
If the segmented markets hypothesis
holds, a shock at one end of the market is
reﬂected in the other, but to different degrees.
Consequently, the relationship between
long-term and short-term rates reﬂects the
DDD iTmfftar tttt =+++ gdme 3
Longer-Term Rates Response  
to Federal Funds Rate Target
Changes
CoefﬁcientT12m T10y T30y
g –0.0003 –0.0007 –0.0007
(0.34) (0.58) (0.68)
d 0.7476* 0.5829* 0.4451*
(18.28) (12.49) (11.21)
m 0.0295 –0.1104* –0.1030*
(0.72) (2.42) (2.49)
s.e. 0.0360 0.0526 0.0480
Adj. R20.4451 0.1704 0.1245
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation 
consistent covariance estimates with a lag of 7.
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usual degree of arbitrage between these
ends of the market.  Alternatively, it could
reﬂect the differential response of both markets
to the same shock—a change in the funds
rate target.  The fact that the marketresponds
differently to policy shocks suggests that
they have different implications for those
markets.  An important differenceis their
implication for the future course of inﬂation.
The signiﬁcant difference in the usual
relationship between long-term and T-bill
rates associated with changes in the funds
rate target tends to support the interpreta-
tion that target changes affect the market’s
inﬂation outlook.  Ideally, a direct connection
between inﬂation expectations and changes
in the funds rate target would verifythis
interpretation.  This connection is not possible,
however, because daily measures of themar-
ket’s inﬂation expectation, whichhave been
available only recently, are insufﬁcient to test
the hypothesis directly.10Evidence of the
market’ s reaction to employment reports tends
to support this interpretation, however.
Long-term rates respond as much(or more
than) short-term rates to employment 
surprises.  Presumably this is because
employment surprises generate expectations
of a permanent change in the real rate.  If
changes in the funds rate produced equally
permanent changes in the real rate, the
smaller response of long-term rates to target
changes would appear to be because the
market revises its inﬂation outlook.
DOES THE REACTION VARY
WITH THE SIZE OF THE
ACTION?
To test whether the market’s reaction
varies with the size of the Fed’s action, the
equation
was estimated, where target changes are
partitioned into large, and small
changes, .  Here, and in all subse-
quent estimates, when the ithrate is T3m, d
is set to zero.  A large change is more than
25 basis points in absolute value, while a
small change is exactly 25 basis points.
Only seven of the 32 target changes were
large.  There was one 75 basis point
change and six 50 basis point changes. 
Estimates of Equation 3 are presented
in Table 4.  The reaction of T3mis the same
regardless of the target change.  Hence, the
size of the change does not appear to make
a difference at the short-end of the market.
The reaction at the longer-end of the market
is different, however.  Speciﬁcally, the reac-
tion of T12mis larger for small changes in
the funds rate target and smaller for large
target changes.  This difference is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, however.  The absolute
value of theresponse for T10yand T30yis
greater for larger target changes.  These
results suggestthat the market believes


























10The Treasury began issuing 
10-year Treasury Inﬂation
Protected Securities (TIPS) in
January 1997 and 30-year
TIPS in April 1998.
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Table 4
The Market’s Response to Federal Funds
Rate Target Changes by the Size of the
Target Change
Coefﬁcient T3m  T12m  T10y  T30y
g –0.0008  –0.0001  –0.0006 –0.0006
(0.89)  (0.16)  (0.50)  (0.60)
d —  0.7471*  0.5826*  0.4448*
(18.27)  (12.49)  (11.20)
0.3009*   –0.0148  –0.1410*  –0.1311*
(3.91) (0.25)  (2.14)  (2.17)
0.3179*  0.0886*  –0.0696  –0.0656
(5.61)  (2.42)  (1.30)  (1.38)
F-statistic  0.0318  2.2845  0.7433  0.7576
s.e.  0.0407  0.0360  0.0526  0.0480
Adj. R2 0.0902  0.4468  0.1706  0.1248
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation consistent covariance 
estimates with a lag of 7.




11It could be that the Trading
Desk of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York has done a
good job signaling its inten-
tions.  See Feinman (1993)
and Muelendyke (1998) for
discussions of how the Desk
signals its intentions to the
market.
12None of the 12 discount rate
changes were made solely to
realign the discount rate.
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effect on inﬂation;however, the difference
in the reaction is not statistically
signiﬁcant for these rates either.  Because
all seven large funds rate target changes
were accompanied by a change in the dis-
count rate, it is impossibleto determine
whether the difference is due to the size of
the change or to the discount rate change.
IS THE MARKET’S REACTION
LARGER WHEN ACCOMPANIED
BY A DISCOUNT RATE
CHANGE?
Before investigating whether the market’s
response is affected by a discount rate change,
it is important to ask: Why would the Fed
be more likely to change the discount rate
when it makes relatively large adjustments
in its funds rate target?  One possibility is
that the Fed wants the market to know it
is taking action.  This explanation does not
seem likely because most often a discount
rate change accompanies large target
changes.  The market should have a much
easier time identifying large target changes
than small ones.  Moreover, since the fall
of 1989, it appears that the market has had
little difﬁculty identifying target changes
whether the Fed announced them with a
discount rate change or not.11
Another possibility is that the Fed
adjusts the discount rate when it changes
the funds rate target because failure to do
so would cause the spread between the
two rates to become either too wide or too
narrow.  Figure 1, which shows the federal
funds rate, the discount rate, and the funds
rate target over this period, suggests that
the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve did not cut the discount rate until
the point was reached where further cuts
would have caused the spread between the
federal funds rate target and the discount
rate to become negative.  Indeed, this was
the case for each of the ﬁrst seven discount
rate cuts.  On two of these occasions, how-
ever, maintaining the alignment between
the discount rate and the federal funds rate
was not one of the reasons the Fed gave for
reducing the discount rate.  Furthermore,
on none of these occasions was this the sole
reason given for changing the discount rate.
Furthermore, the need to make a tech-
nical adjustment was not given as a reason
for any of the four discount rate increases.12
Hence, it appears that the discount rate
changes (made when interest rates were
rising) were not made to prevent the
spread from becoming too large.  This is
not surprising since, historically, the Fed
has tolerated a spread of 300 basis points
or more.
It could be that the Fed made large
changes in the target to emphasize its
resolve, which it underscored by simulta-
neously changing the discount rate.  This
interpretation is consistent with the fact
that all seven large target changes were
accompanied by a discount rate change.
Of course, the discount rate could have
changed out of concern for the size of the
spread as well as to underscore the Fed’s
policy resolve.
To test whether the market’s reaction
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is estimated.  Target changes are
partitionedinto those accompanied by 
a discount rate change, and
those not accompanied by a discount rate
change, Twelve of the 32 target
changes during this period were accompa-
nied by a discount rate change.  On the
last six of these occasions, the target
change equaled the discount rate change.
On ﬁve of the previous six occasions, the
target change was exactly half of the
discount rate change. 
The results are presented in Table 5.
Given that the seven large target changes
were accompanied by a discount rate
change, it is not surprising that these
results are very similar to the results of
large and small target changes.  The fact
that the T3mdoes not respond differently
when the Fed changes the discount rate is
consistent with my previous ﬁnding,
Thornton (1996). 
Because seven of the 12 discount rate
changes coincide with large target changes,
it is difﬁcult to determine whether the
response is larger because the Fed changed
the discount rate or because the Fed made
a large change in the funds rate target.  To
separate the discount rate effect from the
size effect, the 12 target changes associated
with discount rate changes are partitioned
into the seven large changes, D fftart
D dr1g,
and the ﬁve small ones, D fftart
D drsm.  The
results, summarized in Table 6, suggest
that it is the discount rate change, not the
size of the target change, that matters for
the behavior of long-term rates.  Again, the
response of the 3-month T-bill rate is essen-
tiallythe same whether the discount rate is
changed or not, or whether the target change
is large or small.  The effect on longer-term
rates depends on the discount rate.  This is
particularly true for the 10- and 30-year
rates, where the effect of a target change is
much smaller if accompanied by a change
in the discount rate.  
If the reason that long-term rates
respond differently to target changes is
because the market revises its outlook for
inﬂation, then the results in Table 6
suggest that this effect is associated with
the 12 occasions when the Fed simultane-
ously changed the discount rate.  When
target changes are not accompanied by a
discount rate change, the response is only
slightly smaller and not statistically signiﬁ-
cant from the usual relationship with the
T-bill rate.
IS THE MARKET’S REAC
TION LARGER WHEN THERE
IS A CHANGE IN THE
DIRECTION OF POLICY?
The question of whether the market’s
reaction is different when the Fed changes
the direction of policy is difﬁcult to address
because there were only three changes in
policy direction during the sample period.
The ﬁrst 21 target changes were negative
for a total of 600 basis points.  Moreover,
extending the sample backward is not
likely to generate signiﬁcantly different








The Market’s Response to Federal Funds
Rate Target Changes Accompanied by
Discount Rate Changes
Coefﬁcient T3m  T12m  T10y  T30y
g –0.0008  –0.0002  –0.0006  –0.0006
(0.92) (0.23)  (0.53)  (0.61)
d —  0.7476*  0.5829*  0.4452*
(18.28)  (12.49)  (11.20)
0.3093*  –0.0030  –0.1374* –0.1337*
(4.56)  (0.06)  (2.36)  (2.50)
0.3061*  0.0913*  –0.0590  –0.0446
(4.34)  (2.23)  (0.90)  (0.79)
F-statistic  0.0010  2.0636  0.8342  1.3585
s.e.  0.0407  0.0360  0.0526  0.0480
Adj. R2 0.0901  0.4464  0.1707  0.1253
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation consistent covariance 
estimates with a lag of 7.




reacting to funds rate target changes
during the late 1980s.  Despite this limita-
tion, the equation
is estimated.  Target changes are
partitioned into those that constitute a
new direction for policy, D fftart
nd and 
those that are changes in the same
direction, D fftart
sd.
The results are presented in Table 7.
The response of T3mis larger when the
direction of policy was changed.  Indeed,
the response of the three longer-term rates
is larger than normal when the funds rate
target changes direction; and the difference
is statistically signiﬁcant for all but T30y.
The fact that mndis statistically insigniﬁcant
for the 30-year rate suggests that the 30-year
rate moved normally in response to a
change in the 3-month T-bill rate.  The 3-
month rate also responds more when there
is a change in the direction of policy, but
the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In comparison, the 12-month and 10-year
rates move signiﬁcantly more when the target
change marks a change in the direction of
policy.  These responses are consistent with
the inﬂation-expectations interpretation
for the lack of response of the long-term
rates to target changes.  Because rates tend
to exhibit considerable persistence, i.e.,
moving up or down over long cycles, when
rates ﬁrst start to move up or down the
market might believe that there will be a
signiﬁcant change in the real rate.  This
interpretation is particularly compelling
for the 10-year rate because it responded
signiﬁcantly more than usual to a change
in the 3-month T-bill rate.  The observed
larger responses of T12mand T10ymay
have led some market analysts to suggest
that the market’s reaction is larger when
the direction of policy is changed.  Because
of the small number of direction changes
over this sample period, however, caution
is required.13
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to inves-
tigateseveral hypotheses concerning the
market’s reaction to changes in the Fed’s
funds rate target during the period between
October 2, 1989, through December 31,
1997.  Principal among these hypotheses is
whether there is a difference in the reaction
of short-term and long-term interest rates,
which suggest that these actions cause the
market to change its expectation for inﬂa-
tion.  While response of the 10-year and
30-year Treasury rates to changes in the funds
rate target was not statistically signiﬁcant,
the lack of response did mark a statistically
signiﬁcant departure from the usual relation-
ship betweenthese long-term rates and the






















13Extending the sample back to
March of 1984 produces results
that are less encouraging to the
hypothesis—the response is
larger when there is a change
in the direction of policy.
The Market’s Response to Large and Small
Federal Funds Rate Target Changes
Accompanied by Discount Rate Changes
CoefﬁcientT3m T12m T10y T30y
g–0.0007 –0.0001 –0.0006 –0.0006
(0.88) (0.16) (0.51) (0.62)
d — 0.7472* 0.5828* 0.4453* 
(18.25) (12.49) (11.20)
0.3009* –0.0149 –0.1410* –0.1312*
(3.91) (0.25) (2.14) (2.18)
0.3650* 0.0765 –0.1128* –0.1504*
(8.21) (1.13) (2.34) (2.76)
0.3062* 0.0916* –0.0589 –0.0447
(4.34) (2.23) (0.90) (0.79)
F-statistic 0.0026 2.2378 0.8104 1.1288
s.e. 0.0407 0.0360 0.0526 0.0480
Adj. R20.0900 0.4466 0.1703 0.1249
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation consistent covariance 
estimates with a lag of 7.







evidence is presented, I think it is reason-
able to interpret the marked departure in
the usual relationship between these rates
as being due to a revision of the market’s
outlook for inﬂation.  This is particularly
true since statistical tests rule out the pos-
sibility that long-term rates simply do not
respond signiﬁcantly to changes in the
funds rate target.Moreover, this interpreta-
tion is consistent with the ﬁnding that
long-term rates respondas much (or more
than) short-term rates to other real shocks,
such as the employment report.  If this
interpretation is correct, the results
suggest that the Fed has some credibility
as an inﬂation ﬁghter.
Further analysis, however, shows that
nearly all of the signiﬁcant departure in
the relationship between long-term and
short-term rates associated with target
changes is due to the 12 target changes
that were accompanied by a change in the
discount rate.  Hence, it is the discount
rate that appears to matter most for the
market’s inﬂation outlook.  Once the
change in the discount rate is accounted
for, the size of the target change does not
appear to be important in determining the
market’s reaction.
Finally, the reaction of all rates to a
target change appears to be somewhat
larger when the target change marks a
change in the direction of policy.  Interest-
ingly, none of the changes in the direction
of policy was accompanied by a discount
rate change.  The reader is cautioned,
however, that the sample size on which
this result is based is very small.
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The purpose of this appendix is to
investigate whether the effect of a funds
rate target change on the relationship
between long-term and T-bill rates is due
to a nonlinear relationship between changes
in the T-bill and long-term rates.  Speciﬁcally,
long-term rates may not move proportion-
ately with changes in the T-bill rate when
there are large changes in the T-bill rate.
Since large changes in the T-bill rate are
likely to be associated with changes in the
funds rate target, it is possible that the results
are due to a fundamental nonlinear relation-
ship between changes in the T-bill and
long-term rates.  To test for this possibility,
large changes in the T-bill rate, 
were identiﬁed.  A change in the T-bill rate
is considered large if it is more than two
standard deviations of the daily change in
the T-bill rate over the sample period.
Next the equation
was estimated using both DT10y and
DT30y.  If the relationship between the
long-term rate and the T-bill rate is different
when there are large changes in the T-bill
rate, estimates of m will be signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero.  This equation was estimated
during the period between August 11, 1987,
through December 31, 1997, and during
the period between October 6, 1982, through
August 10, 1987.  The latter period was used
because the market did not respond signif-
icantly to target changes during this time frame.
Consequently, during this time, large
changes in the T-bill rate deﬁnitely are 
not associated with changes in the funds
rate target. 
Estimates of Equation A.1 are presented
in Table A.1.  There were 91 large changes
in the T-bill rate during the ﬁrst period
and 120 during the second.  The results
suggest no signiﬁcant nonlinearity during
either period.  The estimate of m was nega-
tive, but very small and not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The results for the ﬁrst period could
be affected by the fact that some of the
large changes in the T-bill rate occurred
when there was a change in the funds rate
target.  Hence, the effect of large changes
in the T-bill rate is confounded with changes
in the funds rate target.  To separate these
effects, the equation
was estimated, where  denotes
large changes in the T-bill rate not accom-
panied by a target change, and 
denotes changes in the T-bill rate accompa-
nied by a target change.  If there is an essential
nonlinear relationship between changes 
in long-term and T-bill rates, the estimate
of  should be negative and statistically
signiﬁcant.  Moreover, if nonlinearity is
responsible for the reaction of the long-
term and T-bill rates to target changes, the
hypothesis  will not be rejected. 
Estimates of Equation A.2 are
presented in Table A.2. While the null
hypothesis that  is not rejected, the
point estimates of d2 are much larger in
absolute value than the point estimates of
d1.  Likewise, the estimates of d1 are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5
percent level.  These results suggest that
the effect of a funds rate target change on
the relationship between the long-term
and T-bill rates is not due to nonlinearity
in the relationship itself.  Hence, it appears
that the response of long-term rates is sig-
niﬁcantly different when the source of the
shock is monetary policy. 
d d 1 2 =
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Estimates of Equation A.1
8/11/87—12/31/97  10/6/82—8/10/87
Coefﬁcient T10y  T30y  T10y  T30y
g –0.0010  –0.0010  –0.0011  –0.0013
(0.92)  (1.04)  (0.49)  (0.60)
d 0.5346*  0.4172*  0.6785*  0.5602*
(15.37)  (13.58)  (14.12)  (12.58)
m –0.0857  –0.0540  –0.1277  –0.1057
(1.11)  (0.71)  (1.63)  (1.45)
s.e.  0.0557  0.0525  0.0730  0.0685
Adj. R2 0.1889  0.1414  0.2932  0.2427
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation consistent covariance 
estimates with a lag of 8 for the ﬁrst period and with a lag of 6 for the second period.
Table A.1
Estimates of Equation A.2
Coefﬁcient  T10y  T30y
g –0.0011  –0.0011
(0.99)  (1.12)
d0 0.5575*  0.4363*
(16.42)  (14.28)
d1 –0.0923  –0.0577
(1.26)  (0.82)
d2 –0.2156*  –0.1876*
(2.45) (2.35)
F-statistic  1.2802  1.6645
s.e.  0.0557  0.0525
Adj. R2 0.1905  0.1430
*Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Estimated with the Newey-West heteroskedastic autocorrelation
consistent covariance estimates with a lag of 8.
d d 1 2 =
Table A.2